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kommt; nur dessen Beiträge sollen in dieser Zeitschrift einzeln in den Blick genommen 
werden. 
Der Philosoph Ton van den Beld (Utrecht), der durch seine Arbeiten über Masaryk 
international bekannt geworden ist, greift in seinem Beitrag, den er bei der Londoner 
Masaryk-Konferenz 1986 zur Diskussion gestellt hat, ein Thema der Moral aus dem 
Umfeld von Masaryks Habilitationsschrift auf und behandelt den „Unterschied zwi­
schen Mord und struktureller Gewalt", also dem nichtwillentlichen Töten; er spannt 
dabei den Bogen von einer Erwiderung Masaryks auf einen radikalen Artikel in 
„Nezávislé listy" von 1904 bis zu Marcuse und Galtung. 
Jaroslav Krejčí (Lancaster) hat „den Prager Frühling neu besehen" und versucht, 
durch eine „soziologische Neubewertung" Eigenarten der Reformbewegung von 
1968, u. a. auch aus dem Vergleich mit Ungarn und Polen, herauszuarbeiten. 
Einen klärenden Einblick in die Vielfalt von oppositionellen Organisationen und 
Aktionen zwischen dem Beginn der „Normalisierung" und der Veröffentlichung der 
Charta '77 gibt die Übersicht von Hans Renner (Groningen) über „die tschechoslowa­
kische Opposition 1969-1976" anhand der Frage „Was der Charta 77 vorherging". 
Den Reigen der auf die Tschechoslowakei bezogenen Beiträge beschließt Zdeněk 
Suda (Pittsburgh) mit einer grundsätzlichen Untersuchung der „nature of Czech 
nationalism", der manche interessante Deutung bringt, etwa über „die Geburt des 
Politischen aus dem Religiösen", und in gewissem Sinne eine methodisch modernere 
Fortführung des Masarykschen Ansatzes darstellt. 
Zdeněk Dittrich, der sich manchmal in seiner Notwendigkeit zur fachlichen Breite 
wie ein „Mädchen für alles in partibus infidelium" fühlte, also zunächst nahezu der 
einzige Experte für Ostmitteleuropa in den Niederlanden, hat jetzt, das beweist dieser 
beachtliche Band, eine Reihe von Schülern, jüngeren Kollegen und Freunden auf sei­
nem Gebiet um sich versammelt, die Dittrichs - in einem Schriftenverzeichnis am 
Ende des Bandes aufgelistetes und sicher noch keineswegs abgeschlossenes - Werk 
weitertragen. 
Marburg an der Lahn H a n s L e m b e r g 
Gorbachov, Mikhail: Perestrojka: New Thinkingfor our Country and the World. 
Harper & Row, New Nork 1987, 255 pp. 
In this book 1, Mikhail Gorbachov draws a bold parallel with the history of the 
Western world. France, Britain, and Germany, he says, all needed several revolutions 
to consolidate their Systems. Why should the Soviet Union not proeeed likewise? 
Perestroika ist communism's second revolution. 
There is some logic in this cönstruet. Artefacts are indeed seldom manufactured in 
1
 In German: Perestrojka: Die zweite russische Revolution. Eine neue Politik für Europa und 
die Welt. Droemer Knaur, München 1987. 
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perfect form at the first attempt. Socicties have undergone revolutions and reforms 
since they began to exist. We should not deny Mikhail Gorbachov the right to a second 
bite at the cherry, especially since he has choosen to set in motion a systém which has 
always presenteditself as final andfinite. Improvement, the system's practitioners have 
always been saying, may be needed, but not Substantive change. Nevertheless, Gorba-
chov's outline of his reformist program causes some irritation to the Western observer 
because of what can only be perceived as a measure of dishonesty in the argument. 
Question of Paternity. The Soviet leader clamourously rediscovers the wheels on 
which the rest of us have been moving forward for decades, and he does so with recti-
tude, as if to shame the devil in us. Virtually all that he proposes to do in order to im-
prove his society originates in the West, from the market economy and technological 
progress to human rights and populär participation in the running of public affairs. 
And yet, not only does Gorbachov fail to acknowledge Western paternity, but he 
sermonizes about Lenin's heritage and the "hitherto unused potential of socialism" 
which will allow all of the allegedly "new" ideas to flourish. 
Even if wein the West choose notto carp and cavil with the Soviet leader's commend-
able effort at restructuring, we need not refrain from citing reality back at him. N o 
matter which quotes Gorbachov uses, Lenin is not one of the fathers of democracy, 
and the Soviet systém has never engendered from within itself a pioneering quality 
other than applying force and imposing its ideology on others. In undertaking 
perestroika, the USSR does not really propose to pull itself up from the morass by its 
own boot straps. Much more, perestroika represents free-world-assisted reform 
except that, unlike Poland in the first half of the 1970s, it relies on the infusion of 
Western concepts, not money. 
Which Socialism? Another jarring note resounds from the way in which Gorbachov 
speaks of "socialism" when he means "communism". For most Europeans, if not for 
Americans, socialism represents a legitimate socio-political tendency of which com-
munism is but an aberration. When Marxist communism threatened to engulf the 
movement for political and social emancipation among the working classes, the first 
and substantial perestroika of the Marxist ideology took place toward the end of last 
Century. It was then that democratic socialism and the social democratic parties were 
born. Eduard Bernstein, rather than Lenin or Gorbachov, is the father of revision and 
reform. The socially-conscious democratic State that the Soviet leader now presumes 
to bring about owes its existence to interaction between the social democratic move-
ment and liberal capitalism. Through the Communist International and Moscow's 
extreme hostility to non-communist socialism, the Soviet systém has destroyed the 
capacity of ruling communist parties to make the chemistry of non-confrontational 
social and liberal politics work. Democratic socialism as it has evolved and is under-
stood in the West has no need to reform itself on this score; communism has. 
Ambivalence. It is Gorbachov's right to believe in the ultimate success of his pere-
stroika. Politicians do not launch major campaigns without professing confidence. 
Nevertheless, the Western mind is inquisitive, critical, and skeptical. We have every 
right to be so when a momentous message is directéd at us from quarters not previously 
known for living up to expectations and promises. It appears that the Soviet leader be-
lieves in his system's ambidexterity, that is, the ability to handle skillfully both the 
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Western and the Soviet communist value components of perestroika. He teils us that 
"we have no ready-made formulas" but presents a whole series of them in the book. 
Lenin remains the fountainhead, collectivization was and is necessary, and the party 
stays the only holder of real power - to mention just three. "More socialism and more 
democracy," he says. We know that compromises are a legitimate way of tackling con­
flict, but we are also aware of their limitations when it comes to basic values. 
What Gorbachov has in mind seems to be a shift of emphasis or a change in propor-
tion rather than the removal of unworkable formulas from policy making. He speaks 
of "a new concept of democratic centralism" in which democracy and centralism will 
be "correctly balanced." It turns out, however, that his intention is merely to devolve 
some economic power from the planning bodies to enterprises while keeping massive 
control at the center. "AU this will take place within the mainstream of socialist goals 
and principles of management," he says, indicating that the party will retain its 
supreme role in the economy. 
One is left with the impression that Western values are only being borrowed in con-
trollable doses, as a medicíně to eure what the diagnostician perceives to be no more 
than a transient indisposition of an otherwise sound organism. 
Default. A cheeklist of aspects of communist rule which are not mentioned or are 
only glossed over in Gorbachov's master plan would be very long. His sketch of Soviet 
history is woefully incomplete; relations with Eastern Europe are scantily treated; the 
religious issue is left out; and the role of private enterprise receives next to no consider­
ation. 
As an example of the inadequacies, the four pages devoted to the nationality issue in 
the American edition of Gorbachov's book are particularly disappointing. In the first 
place, they contain too much meaningless propaganda. Gorbachov says that against 
the background of national strif e elsewhere in the world, "the USSR represents a truly 
unique example in the history of human civilization." In his opinion, being a multina­
tional country is for the Soviet Union "a factor of might rather than weakness or dis-
integration." Even worse than the clichés is the reduction of problems to an anodyne 
level. Gorbachov holds that nationalism "sometimes happens" and that international-
ism "does not always come easily." There is no self-criticism and no promise of 
remedy with regard to the Russification of national cultures and diserimination against 
the use of national languages. 
It goes without saying that Gorbachov does not mention "Sovietization" as a form 
of supranational imposition. There is enough evidence that many nations in the USSR 
regard the Soviet communist regime as a curtailment of their right to self-determina­
tion because it is Soviet, not only because it is Russian-centered. This is surely also the 
čase with a part of the Russian nation as well as with the nations of Eastern Europe. 
As for solutions, Gorbachov offers a continuing process of sblizhenie or "growing-
closer" through internationalist education, and greater tact in inter-ethnic relations. 
The idea of self-determination to the point of secession does not figuře in his program, 
despite its embodiment in pre-revolutionary communist doctrine and the Soviet Con­
stitution. Only the section in the chapter of the book devoted to the Third World bears 
the title "Nations Have the Right to Choose their Own Way of Development." For 
the nations ofthe USSR and those under Soviet tutelage this evidently does not apply. 
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The Prague Spring. The book contains only one cryptic reference to the vexing issue 
of Czechoslovakia's suppressed reforms of 1968 and their relevance to current Soviet 
efforts. In virtually the only concrete example in the section on Eastern Europe he 
writes that people in Prague (which he visited in April 1987) approve of his reforms. 
He claimes that a young man told him, "Say the truth, beware of the truth, and let 
others have their truth." Gorbachov does not mention if he knew that this was a 
paraphrase of John Hus, the fifteenth Century religious reformer, and that it was one 
of the most frequently-cited mottos of the Prague Spring. He replied, perhaps unin-
tentionally complementing the quotation, "and act in conformance with the truth". 
Gorbachov also apparently told the man, "Often one must retreat a step in order to 
move forward later. This is a painful process, to rethink, to analýze, and yet again to 
analýze; but one must not be afraid of doing it." This passage can be deciphered as a 
reference to the Prague Spring and to related action and attitudes that may need revi-
sion, but why must Gorbachov still hide behind such arcane language? 
A View from the Bridge. Mikhail Gorbachov's book about perestroika can be read 
as a cultural message to the West. Despite the self-righteousness, ambivalence, and 
lacunae, it is essentially a moderate and benign signál that a process has started in the 
USSR whereby a small measure of Western values will be injected into communist 
political behaviour. It would be silly to expect that this process can begin with Gorba-
chov's rapid march across the East-West bridge to a democratic Canossa. The Soviet 
leader's feet remain planted on the communist ground and, while he has begun to look 
our way, his vision is still obscured by ideological obstinacy. There are still chinks in 
his shining reformist armour, and we need not refrain from pointing a finger at them. 
In doing so, we can be heartened by his own conclusion: 
I am deeply convinced that the book is not yet finished, nor can it be finished. . . . 
What looks acceptable and sufficient today may be obsolete tomorrow. . . . In the 
course of restructuring we are expanding and clarifying our notions about the 
yesterday, today and tomorrow of socialism. 
Amen, so be it. Perhaps it is best to regard this volume as no more than an introduc-
tion to a longer book. One hopes that the people who have to live under communism 
will contribute their own chapters to it. 
Munich V l a d i m i r V. K u s i n 
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Der Titel ist schwierig, wie man liest, und der Gegenstand auch. Sammelwerke 
haben das mitunter an sich. Die Geduld der Bibliothekare, die im Titel eines solchen 
Werkes gleich auch noch seine Entstehungsgeschichte festhalten müssen, wird man 
